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THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT . . . 
MAYBE: “VIOLENT FELONIES” AND THE 
ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT IN UNITED 
STATES v. VANN 
Abstract: On October 11, 2011, in United States v. Vann, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Torrell 
Vann’s three prior indecent liberties convictions were not violent felo-
nies under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In so do-
ing, the per curiam majority attempted to interpret the vague residual 
clause of the ACCA and concluded that taking improper liberties or 
committing lewd acts on the body of a child were not the type of convic-
tions worthy of the fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison sentence 
mandated by the ACCA. This Comment argues that the time has come 
for Congress to amend the ACCA or for the U.S. Supreme Court to de-
clare it void for vagueness, because an individual’s liberty cannot rest 
upon ad hoc judicial conjectures. 
Introduction 
 On January 20, 2008, police officers found Torrell Vann in pos-
session of a pistol and arrested him for violations of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924.1 Pursuant to § 924(e)(1), if an accused person 
has three or more “violent felony” convictions as defined by the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), he or she is subject to an en-
hanced sentence with a mandatory minimum of fifteen years in pris-
on and the possibility of a life sentence.2 Thus, in 2011, in United States 
v. Vann, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was called 
upon to analyze whether Torrell Vann’s three prior indecent liberties 
convictions were “violent felony” convictions under the ACCA.3 In a 
per curiam decision, the Fourth Circuit concluded they were not.4 But 
despite the Fourth Circuit’s decision to issue a per curiam opinion in 
                                                                                                                      
1 See United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam). 
18 U.S.C. prohibits felons from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving any firearm 
or ammunition in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
(2006). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)–(2) comprises the Armed Career Criminal Act. 
Armed Career Criminal Act, Id. § 924(e)(1)–(2). 
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The 
Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 209, 215 (2010). 
3 Vann, 660 F.3d at 772–74. 
4 Id. at 773–74. 
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Vann, six judges filed opinions addressing how to interpret the 
ACCA.5 The conflicted conclusions of the members of the panel 
stemmed from the broad language of the ACCA and the inability of 
the U.S. Supreme Court to craft consistent precedent from which 
lower federal courts may analyze whether a crime is a violent felony.6 
 Part I of this Comment explains Vann’s journey through the legal 
system, the history of the ACCA, and how the Supreme Court analyzes 
ACCA cases.7 Part II examines the conflicting opinions of the judges on 
the Vann panel as well as the concern voiced by the judges that Con-
gress passed an overly broad statute.8 Finally, Part III argues that the 
Supreme Court must declare the ACCA an unconstitutionally vague 
statute or Congress must amend the ACCA and specifically enumerate 
which felonies are violent.9 It further argues that, while waiting for 
congressional or Supreme Court action, lower federal courts should 
follow the interpretation adopted in one of the concurrences in Vann 
and focus on congressional intent.10 
I. Vann’s Journey Through the Federal Court System and the 
History of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
A. Vann’s Arrest and Appeal Process 
 On January 20, 2008, police officers arrested Torrell Vann after 
finding him in possession of a Bersa .380 pistol and ammunition.11 
Subsequently, police charged Vann with being a felon in possession of 
a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).12 Additionally, Vann’s 
indictment alleged that he had three prior “violent felony” convic-
tions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).13 Vann’s presentence re-
port showed that he had three previous convictions for violations of 
                                                                                                                      
5 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 771; infra notes 48–71 and accompanying text (discussing the 
different opinions of the judges of the Vann court). 
6 See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that ACCA case law amounts to little more than ad hoc judicial decision making). 
7 See infra notes 11–47 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 48–71 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 72–93 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 72–93 and accompanying text. 
11 Vann, 660 F.3d at 809 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
12 See id. 
13 Id. at 772 (majority opinion). Under § 924 (e)(2)(B), a violent felony is punishable 
by at least one year of imprisonment and “(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C.§ 924(e)(2)(B) (2006). 
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North Carolina’s indecent liberties statute.14 The indecent liberties 
statute punishes individuals who are at least sixteen years old and at 
least five years older than the child in question when those individuals 
take immoral liberties with a child or willfully commit lewd acts with 
the body of a child.15 Vann pled guilty to the charges.16 
 Although a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) typically carries a 
maximum sentence of ten years, because the district court considered 
Vann’s indecent liberties convictions to be violent felonies, he was 
classified as a career criminal under the ACCA and given a mandatory 
fifteen-year sentence.17 The district court did not accept Vann’s argu-
ment that his previous indecent liberties convictions were not violent 
felonies.18 On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the low-
er court’s ruling.19 The court then granted Vann’s petition for a re-
hearing en banc, thereby vacating the panel’s opinion.20 
B. The Armed Career Criminal Act 
 The key to applying the ACCA is understanding what offenses fall 
within the scope of the statute’s reach.21 In 1984, Congress enacted 
the first version of the ACCA to protect society from violent habitual 
criminals.22 The Act’s purpose was to aid law enforcement efforts 
against criminals who commit a large number of the nation’s crimes.23 
Congress wanted to ensure that only felonies that indicated a criminal 
is particularly dangerous when in possession of a firearm fell under 
                                                                                                                      
14 Vann, 660 F.3d at 772; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1 (2011). 
15 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1. The North Carolina statute punishes anyone who: 
(1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any immoral, improper, or indecent 
liberties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the purpose 
of arousing or gratifying sexual desire; or (2) Willfully commits or attempts to 
commit any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body or any part or mem-
ber of the body of any child of either sex under the age of 16 years. 
Id. 
16 Vann, 660 F.3d at 772. 
17 See id. at 773. 
18 See id. at 810 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
19 Id. at 773 (majority opinion). 
20 See id. at 773, 776–77. 
21 See Holman, supra note 2, at 209. 
22 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990); Brett T. Runyan, Comment, 
ACCA Residual Clause: Strike Four? The Court’s Missed Opportunity to Create a Workable Residual 
Clause Violent Felony Test, 51 Washburn L.J. 447, 450 (2012). 
23 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581; Runyan, supra note 22, at 450. 
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the scope of the ACCA.24 Consequently, under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(1)–(2), criminals who violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)25 and have 
been convicted of three “violent felonies” or serious drug offenses26 
are subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years’ im-
prisonment.27 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) states that three pri-
or violent felony convictions requires the mandatory minimum fif-
teen-year prison sentence and § 924(e)(2) defines the term violent 
felony.28 In defining the term violent felony, Congress enumerated 
four violent felonies and then included a residual provision that in-
cludes all felonies that “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”29 
 The ACCA’s “residual provision” has led to significant confusion 
among federal courts, including the Vann court sitting en banc.30 In 
assessing whether previous felonies fall within the residual provision, 
courts use two approaches engrained in Supreme Court precedent: 
                                                                                                                      
24 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581–90 (examining the legislative history of the ACCA); 
Runyan, supra note 22, at 451; Hayley A. Montgomery, Comment, Remedying the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act’s Ailing Residual Provision, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 715, 717 (2010). 
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (forbidding individuals who have been convicted of 
crimes punishable by at least one year in prison from possessing any firearm or ammunition). 
26 Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Serious drug offenses are another type of conviction that 
Congress chose to include within the scope of the ACCA. See id. Serious drug offenses can 
be combined with violent felonies to equal the required three violent felony convictions to 
trigger the ACCA. Id. 
27 Id. § 924(e)(1). 
28 Id. § 924(e)(1)–(2). 
29 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) provides an alternative type of 
violent felony covering offenses that involve “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Congress originally 
included only two predicate felonies, robbery and burglary, which automatically qualified 
as violent when it first enacted the ACCA. Runyan, supra note 22, at 450. Subsequently, 
Congress amended § 924(e) with the goal of expanding the predicate felonies. See id. at 
451. The legislature proposed amendments in two bills, both of which would have man-
dated that any felony with an element of violence or attempted violence against a person 
be deemed a “violent felony.” See id. All members of Congress focused on one key issue: 
ensuring that the predicate felonies swept under the ACCA sentence enhancement would 
not be too expansive while simultaneously ensuring that the sentence enhancement provi-
sion would not be under-inclusive. See id. Ultimately, Congress reached a compromise 
whereby certain felonies were enumerated as violent and others could qualify as violent 
based on whether the crime presented a “serious potential risk of physical injury” to an-
other person. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 586–87 (describing the history of the ACCA). The 
current enumerated felonies are burglary, arson, extortion, and felonies involving use of 
explosives. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
30 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Vann, 660 F.3d at 787 (Agee, J., 
concurring) (referring to the ACCA residual provision as “a black hole of confusion and 
uncertainty [that] stymies our best efforts”). 
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the “categorical approach” and the “modified categorical approach.”31 
To determine whether federal or state statutory offenses qualify under 
the ACCA as violent felonies, courts usually use the categorical ap-
proach.32 Under this approach, courts look solely at the fact of convic-
tion and the elements of the offense, without regard to the offense as 
committed.33 
 But when a statute includes multiple categories of conduct, some 
of which are potentially ACCA violent felonies, courts apply the modi-
fied categorical approach.34 Under this approach, when considering a 
statute that describes multiple criminal acts, courts essentially split the 
statute and look at each particular type of conduct separately.35 Alt-
                                                                                                                      
31 Vann, 660 F.3d at 778 (King, J., concurring). There is no requirement that a court 
choose one approach over the other; decisions are made based upon the structure of the 
specific state or federal statute. See Ted Koehler, Note, Assessing Divisibility in the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1521, 1523–24 (2012). 
32 See United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the 
categorical approach is preferred to the more searching analysis required under the modi-
fied categorical approach); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. In 1990, in Taylor v. United States, the 
Supreme Court first articulated the categorical approach and held that the residual provi-
sion usually requires only an examination of the fact of a defendant’s conviction and the 
elements of the offense in the abstract. See id.; R. Daniel O’Connor, Note, Defining the Strike 
Zone—An Analysis of the Classification of Prior Convictions Under the Federal “Three Strikes and 
You’re Out” Scheme, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 847, 851 (1995). In other words, a prior conviction must 
be a violent felony as a matter of law; it does not have to be committed in a violent manner 
in a specific case. See Holman, supra note 2, at 213. For instance, the crime of tampering 
with a witness in Connecticut simply requires the inducement of a witness to withhold 
testimony or not show up for a legal proceeding. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-151 (2007). Alt-
hough no violent act is required, a person could kill a witness in order to prevent the wit-
ness’s testimony. See Holman, supra note 2, at 213. This violence does not make the crime 
categorically violent because proof of violence to secure a conviction is not required. See id. 
Therefore, conviction under Connecticut’s witness tampering statute would fall outside 
the ACCA residual provision under the categorical approach. See id. 
33 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
34 See Koehler, supra note 31, at 1523. For example, the Vann majority viewed the inde-
cent liberties statute as including multiple categories of conduct—and therefore requiring 
the modified categorical approach—because it concluded that subsections (a)(1) and 
(a)(2) regulate sufficiently distinct behaviors. See Vann, 660 F.3d at 799 (Keenan, J., con-
curring). Subsection (a)(1) proscribes “immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with any 
child.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1(a)(1) (2011). Subsection (a)(2), however, proscribes 
“lewd or lascivious acts upon or with the body of any child.” Id. § 14-202.1(a)(2). 
35 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 778 (King, J., concurring). For instance, in 2010, in Johnson v. 
United States, the Supreme Court evaluated a Florida battery statute that penalized “1. 
[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing] or strik[ing] another person against the will of the 
other; or 2. [i]ntentionally caus[ing] bodily harm to another person.” 130 S. Ct. 1265, 
1266 (2010); see Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a) (2007). Because the Florida statute was stated in 
the disjunctive, the Court in Johnson concluded that it contained “three separate offenses 
. . . (1) intentionally causing bodily harm; (2) intentionally striking a victim; or (3) actually 
and intentionally touching a victim.” See Vann, 660 F.3d at 812–13 (discussing the holding 
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hough a court still must avoid looking at the offense as committed,36 if 
only one of the types of behavior described in the statute constitutes a 
violent felony as defined, the defendant is subject to an enhanced 
sentence.37 Consequently, the modified categorical approach, as dis-
tinguished from the categorical approach, is applied when a statute 
proscribes multiple distinct behaviors, any one of which would satisfy 
the definition of a violent felony.38 For example, if a state statute crim-
inalizes burglary of a building and burglary of a motor vehicle, the 
modified categorical approach authorizes courts to divide the prohib-
ited conduct into two categories: burglary of a building (a violent fel-
ony) and burglary of a vehicle (not a violent felony).39 Then, the 
courts may consult various “Shepard-approved documents”—such as 
charging documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, 
judicial findings of fact and conclusions of law, jury instructions, and 
verdict forms—to determine the category of behavior into which the 
defendant’s conduct falls.40 If the information contained within these 
documents shows that the defendant committed burglary of a build-
ing, the court is required to apply the ACCA sentence enhancement.41 
Therefore, the modified categorical approach essentially enables a 
court to categorize the behavior underlying a defendant’s conviction 
as either violent or nonviolent.42 
                                                                                                                      
in Johnson (citing Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1269)). Similarly, in 2009, in Chambers v. United 
States, the Supreme Court used the modified categorical approach because the Illinois 
statute at issue penalized several different types of behavior including: 
(1) escape from a penal institution, (2) escape from the custody of an employee 
of a penal institution, (3) failing to report to a penal institution, (4) failing to 
report for periodic imprisonment, (5) failing to return from furlough, (6) fail-
ing to return from work and day release, and (7) failing to abide by the terms of 
home confinement. 
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126 (2009) (citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/31-
6(a) (2010)). 
36 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 778–79 (King, J., concurring). Therefore, any time a court 
reaches the conclusion that a previous offense constitutes an ACCA violent felony, that 
conclusion must derive from the elements of the conduct regulated. See id. 
37 See id. at 778. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. In Vann, Judge Robert King used this example to illustrate how the modified 
categorical approach operates. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 16 (2010); Vann, 660 F.3d at 
778. 
40 Vann, 660 F.3d at 778; see also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (es-
tablishing the “Shepard-approved” criteria). 
41 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 778. 
42 See id. 
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 The Supreme Court has not provided a bright-line rule to de-
termine whether an offense is swept under the breadth of the residual 
provision.43 In 2007, in James v. United States, the Supreme Court creat-
ed a “closest analog” test and held that attempted burglary poses the 
same level of risk as the completed offense of burglary; thus, the 
Court concluded that attempted burglary falls within the residual 
provision.44 In 2008, in Begay v. United States, however, the Court disre-
garded the closest analog test and determined that, along with a seri-
ous potential for physical injury, violent felonies must be purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive.45 The following year, in 2009, in Chambers v. 
United States, the Court did not focus on the precedential value of ei-
ther James or Begay and instead heavily relied on statistical data to de-
termine whether felony offenses are violent.46 Commenting on these 
decisions in his dissent in Sykes v. United States in 2011, Justice Antonin 
Scalia argued that the ACCA is an unconstitutionally vague statute 
and federal judges are incapable of yielding consistent precedent.47 
II. Vann’s Rehearing En Banc and the Court’s Conflicting 
Opinions on How to Apply the Residual Provision  
to Indecent Liberties 
 In Vann, the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc vacated and remanded 
the panel’s decision and held that Torrell Vann’s indecent liberties 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chambers, 555 U.S. at 131 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
44 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 
192, 211–12 (2007). Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Sykes v. United States in 
2011 refers to the James holding as the closest analog test. See id. 
45 See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144--45 (2008). Because the Court consid-
ered felony driving under the influence (DUI) convictions to be closer to a strict liability 
crime and not purposeful, violent, and aggressive, this felony fell outside the residual 
clause. See id. at 148. 
46 See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 129.The Court in Chambers reviewed a study prepared by 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission that showed that the crime of failure to report carries a 
very low probability of violence. Id. at 130. 
47 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing James, Begay, and Chambers 
as prime examples). Generally, to declare a statute void for vagueness, a court must find 
that the penal statute fails to define a given offense with sufficient definiteness such that 
“ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does 
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing Supreme Court cases reaching back to 1926). In Sykes, Justice 
Scalia focused on the requirement that Congress establish minimal guidelines to govern 
enforcement and concluded that, based on the ambiguous language of the ACCA and the 
inability of the Supreme Court to craft consistent precedent, the time has come to declare 
the ACCA void for vagueness. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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convictions were not violent felonies and consequently fell outside the 
scope of the residual provision.48 Using the modified categorical ap-
proach, the per curiam majority determined that even if subsection 
(a)(2) of the North Carolina indecent liberties statute qualified as a 
violent felony, it was impossible to determine whether Vann had violat-
ed it.49 Nonetheless, the judges did not reach a consensus regarding 
how the court should analyze Vann’s prior felonies.50 The judges filed 
six separate opinions, including one dissent, which argued that inde-
cent liberties was a violent felony and subject to the ACCA sentence 
enhancement.51 More importantly, each judge struggled to apply the 
residual provision.52 
 Overall, the five judges who authored concurring opinions ar-
gued that violent felonies include an element of actual physical con-
tact whereas indecent liberties offenses do not.53 Judge Robert King 
articulated that neither physical contact nor physical proximity is nec-
essary to violate the indecent liberties statute; therefore, the risks of 
violence associated with the enumerated felonies in the residual 
clause, such as burglary or arson, do not exist with indecent liber-
ties.54 Because indecent liberties pose primarily a psychological threat, 
                                                                                                                      
48 See United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 776 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam). 
49 See id. at 773–74. Because none of the charging documents for each of Vann’s three 
prior indecent liberties convictions specified to which subsection Vann pled guilty, the 
court could not determine the particular subsection under which Vann’s conduct fell. See 
id. at 775. 
50 See, e.g., id. at 777 (King, J., concurring) (noting that there are multiple ways of analyz-
ing Vann’s prior felonies). One of the key differences in the approaches of the concurring 
judges derived from a difference of opinion regarding whether to use the categorical ap-
proach or the modified categorical approach. See id. (arguing for using the categorical ap-
proach); id. at 788 (Davis, J., concurring) (arguing for using the categorical approach); id. at 
798 (Keenan, J., concurring) (arguing for using the modified categorical approach); id. at 
802 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (arguing for using the modified categorical approach). A 
discussion of which approach should be used in a given case is outside the scope of this 
Comment. See Koehler, supra note 31, at 1536–51 (providing further reading on this issue). 
51 Vann, 660 F.3d at 771 (indicating the filed opinions); id. at 807 (Niemeyer, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
52 See id. at 787 (Agee, J., concurring); id. at 802 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Judge 
Steven Agee filed a concurrence in which he argued that Congress has created a poorly 
drafted statute and placed the federal courts in a tough position. See id. at 787--88 (Agee, J., 
concurring). Further, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson’s concurrence recognized the extreme 
difficulty federal courts are experiencing in applying the residual clause and posited that it 
may be the result of Congress’s propensity for vague statutes. See id. at 801 (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring). 
53 See, e.g., id. at 781 (King, J., concurring); id. at 804 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
54 See, e.g., id. at 781 (King, J., concurring). Judge King compared indecent liberties to 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of vehicular flight in Sykes v. United States in 2011. 
See id. In Sykes, the Court held that because of the defendant’s determination to elude 
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Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson concluded it is outside the scope of the 
ACCA.55 Similarly, the other concurring judges distinguished this case 
from the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Chambers v. United States to 
downplay the argument that statistical evidence of injury rates for 
sexual assault victims is sufficient to prove an offense qualifies as a vio-
lent felony.56 In his concurrence, Judge King cited the Supreme Court 
majority’s acknowledgement in 2011 in Sykes v. United States that statis-
tical evidence is “not dispositive” and could merely serve as an aid in 
drawing a “commonsense conclusion” about the character of a par-
ticular offense.57 
 Judge Wilkinson’s concurrence sought to maintain a strict focus 
on congressional intent because of the lack of clarity in the language 
in the residual provision.58 Using the modified categorical approach, 
Judge Wilkinson concluded that because the risk of injury associated 
with indecent liberties is psychological in nature, Congress did not 
intend to punish this type of conduct.59 Furthermore, the available 
Shepard-approved documents—a 1991 indictment and a 1998 infor-
mation (a charging document similar to an indictment filed directly 
with the court)—simply recited the language of the indecent liberties 
statute.60 Accordingly, he concluded that the psychological risks asso-
                                                                                                                      
capture through vehicular flight, there is an inherent lack of concern for the safety of oth-
ers and a likelihood that a confrontation between the suspect and police will end in vio-
lence. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011). 
55 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 804 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Judge Wilkinson conceded 
that indecent liberties are morally repugnant offenses but argued that “vile conduct is not 
necessarily violent conduct.” See id. 
56 See, e.g., id. at 785 (King, J., concurring). Specifically, Judge King argued that the dis-
sent’s use of statistics to show that sexual assault victims are often injured physically was 
flawed because the studies cited included rape and other types of conduct which pose little 
similarity to indecent liberties. See id. Additionally, in Chambers, the Supreme Court looked 
to statistical evidence in determining whether an Illinois offense of failure to report was a 
violent felony under the residual provision of the ACCA. See 555 U.S. 122, 129, 130 (2009). 
Because a U.S. Sentencing Commission report showed zero instances of violence in failure-
to-report cases, the Court used this information to anchor its decision that failure to report 
is not a violent felony. See id. 
57 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 785 (King, J., concurring). Judge Paul Niemeyer’s dissent pre-
sented a statistical analysis documenting the injury rate for sexual assault victims. See id. at 
823 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
58 See id. at 801 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
59 See id. at 804. 
60 See id. at 805. Judge Wilkinson argued that merely reciting the statutory language in 
the indecent liberties statute failed to describe the nature of Vann’s behavior that under-
lies the statutory language. See id. Judge Wilkinson posited that although he suspected 
Vann committed violations that would qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA, suspi-
cions are insufficient. See id. 
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ciated with indecent liberties offenses, although heinous, fall outside 
the scope of the ACCA because offensive conduct is not necessarily 
violent.61 
 Despite their disagreement on other matters, all of the concur-
ring judges agreed the ACCA is vaguely worded.62 Judge Steven Agee 
criticized Congress for drafting a poorly written statute and opined 
that ACCA cases will simply be resolved by ad hoc judicial conjectures 
incapable of yielding an intelligible principle.63 In similar fashion, 
Judge King added a footnote at the end of his concurrence to con-
clude that the disagreement among his fellow judges evidenced a 
good faith attempt to apply a poorly written congressional statute.64 
Finally, Judge Wilkinson argued that the judicial difficulty in applying 
and interpreting the ACCA is due in part to Congress’s propensity to 
draft vague statutes.65 
 In contrast to the arguments of the concurring judges, Judge 
Paul Niemeyer, joined by Judge Dennis Shedd, dissented and argued 
that a serious potential risk of actual physical contact is an element of 
indecent liberties.66 Judge Niemeyer asserted that subsection (a)(2) 
requires that a sexual act be committed “upon or with the body” of a 
minor child.67 Because this element is often satisfied through intimate 
physical contact, Judge Niemeyer posited that there is a potential risk 
of physical harm.68 Further, the dissenting judges argued that the sub-
stantial age difference between victim and offender was a controlling 
factor.69 According to Judge Niemeyer, because the age gap between 
offender and victim is substantial, a power disparity exists and poses a 
risk that offenders will employ coercive conduct leading to physical 
violence.70 Finally, unlike the concurring judges, Judge Niemeyer ar-
                                                                                                                      
61 See id. at 804. 
62 See, e.g., id. at 787 (Agee, J., concurring); id. at 797 (Davis, J., concurring) (explaining 
that the ACCA may ultimately be a vague statute); id. at 801--02 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
63 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 787–-88 (Agee, J., concurring). According to Judge Agee, alt-
hough the judges no doubt struggle to interpret the language within the residual provi-
sion, the real consequences are felt by the parties who have an incredible stake in judicial 
interpretation. See id. 
64 See id. at 787 n.9. 
65 See id. at 801. 
66 See id. at 771, 822 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
67 Id. at 822; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1(a)(2) (2011). 
68 Vann, 660 F.3d at 822 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
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gued that statistical evidence helped prove that indecent liberties is a 
violent felony.71 
III. A Proposal for Action by Congress, the Supreme Court, 
and Lower Courts 
 The difficulty the Vann panel experienced in applying the vague 
language of the ACCA residual clause—and the high stakes resulting 
from the possibility of a fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison sen-
tence—demand a bright-line rule for lower courts to follow when 
scrutinizing the ACCA.72 Under the ACCA, an offense carrying a max-
imum penalty of less than ten years in prison can ultimately result in a 
life sentence.73 Thus, how the ACCA is interpreted in a given case car-
ries very real consequences for defendants whose liberty is at stake.74 
The clearest and most effective long-term solution is for Congress to 
amend the ACCA.75 Because Congress has failed to act thus far, how-
ever, the U.S. Supreme Court should declare the statute unconstitu-
tionally vague, thereby forcing Congress’s hand.76 In the meantime, 
                                                                                                                      
71 See id. at 823. The statistical evidence he cited demonstrated that the high incidence 
of physical injuries inherent in sexual assaults were greater than risks associated with 
ACCA-enumerated offenses such as burglary or extortion. See id. 
72 See United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(Agee, J., concurring); Runyan, supra note 22, at 466. In his concurring opinion in Vann, 
Judge Steven Agee specifically called out to Congress to rescue the federal courts from the 
broad, ambiguous language of the residual clause. See Vann, 660 F.3d at 787 (Agee, J., con-
curring). 
73 See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
74 See id. 
75 See id.; Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 134 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring). 
76 See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 134 (Alito, J., concurring). Although another possible solu-
tion would be for the Supreme Court to issue a ruling on what the statute means, such a 
decision would likely represent “another in a series” of ad hoc judicial interpretations. See 
id. Additionally, as Justice Samuel Alito argued in his concurrence in Chambers v. United 
States in 2009, the ACCA residual provision is nearly impossible to apply consistently. See id. 
at 133. If the Supreme Court were finally to declare the ACCA unconstitutionally vague, it 
would present Congress with the opportunity to establish a bright-line rule. See id. at 134. 
This would ensure that nonviolent offenders are not subject to fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum sentences. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Equally important, 
Congress could easily formulate a specific list of expressly defined crimes just as it did 
when it originally enacted the ACCA in 1984. See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 134. Even more 
importantly, because the Supreme Court has admittedly been incapable of yielding con-
sistent applications of the ACCA, it seems inevitable that each new application of the re-
sidual provision will lead the Court further away from the statutory text. See id. at 131. For 
example, in Chambers, the Court’s decision turned on little more than analysis of a statisti-
cal report prepared by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See id. at 134. Even if Congress 
does not rewrite the statute and the ACCA is abolished, courts could simply sentence crim-
inals in accordance with the sentencing guidelines. See Montgomery, supra note 24, at 738. 
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while waiting for Congress or the Supreme Court to act, lower federal 
courts should follow Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson’s concurrence in Vann 
because it strictly adhered to congressional intent.77 
 The optimal long-term answer to the ACCA dilemma is for Con-
gress to amend the ACCA.78 Federal judges have repeatedly written 
opinions criticizing the vague, overly broad language of the residual 
clause.79 As a result of this broad language, application of the statute 
is not uniform.80 Amending the ACCA could be as simple as enumer-
ating which crimes are violent felonies and subject to the ACCA sen-
tence enhancement.81 But Congress does not appear willing to amend 
the ACCA despite numerous pleas from the Supreme Court itself.82 
Consequently, the second best option is for the Supreme Court to 
                                                                                                                      
Further, judges are nonetheless permitted to sentence above the sentencing guidelines if a 
particular individual is so dangerous that a more severe penalty is necessary. See id.; see also 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5K2.2 (2011) (permitting courts to sentence above the 
guideline range for offenses resulting in significant injury); id. § 5K2.3 (permitting courts 
to sentence above the guideline range if a victim suffers extreme psychological injury). 
Although this is not what Congress intended when it drafted the ACCA to address con-
cerns about the recidivism rate of dangerous criminals, abandoning the ACCA would at 
least avoid the inconsistencies plaguing the lower federal courts and allow for fairness in 
sentencing. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581–90 (examining the legislative history of the ACCA); 
Montgomery, supra note 24, at 738. 
77 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 802 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Even though Judge Wilkinson 
attempted to follow strictly the intent of Congress, the text of the ACCA remains vaguely 
worded and therefore following Judge Wilkinson’s opinion in the future is not an optimal 
solution. See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 132 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the federal 
courts are incapable of yielding workable ACCA precedent). 
78 See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 134 (Alito, J., concurring); Jeffrey C. Bright, Violent Felonies 
Under the Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act: Whether Carrying a Concealed Hand-
gun Without a Permit Should Be Considered a Violent Felony, 48 Duq. L. Rev. 601, 633 (2010); 
Jonathan Remy Nash, The Supreme Court and the Regulation of Risk in Law Enforcement, 92 
B.U. L. Rev. 171, 218 (2012). 
79 See, e.g., Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284, 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that the 
time has come to call the ACCA what it truly is: “a drafting failure”); James v. United States, 
550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the drafting of the ACCA was 
“shoddy”); Vann, 660 F.3d at 787 (Agee, J., concurring) (arguing that federal judges have 
entered a “judicial morass that defies systemic solution”); id. at 797 (Davis, J., concurring) 
(conceding that Justice Antonin Scalia may be correct and the residual clause of the ACCA 
may be unconstitutionally vague). 
80 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chambers, 555 U.S. at 132 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
81 See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 134 (Alito, J., concurring); Montgomery, supra note 24, at 
737. 
82 Runyan, supra note 22, at 463. Additionally, it is possible that Congress is hesitant to 
act because, by electing not to include certain offensive felonies, it may create the percep-
tion that Congress is soft on crime. See id. at 451. 
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strike down the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague and force Congress 
to act.83 
 The Supreme Court should declare the ACCA unconstitutionally 
vague because the statute is conducive to arbitrary enforcement.84 Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia’s powerful dissent in Sykes v. United States in 2011 
characterized residual clause cases as a never-ending ad hoc applica-
tion of the ACCA to state offenses.85 Not only does the phrase “or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another” fail to identify clearly which offenses fall 
within the residual provision, but also the Supreme Court itself has 
failed to generate consistent precedent from the residual provision’s 
text.86 Accordingly, the Court’s next residual clause decision should 
void the ACCA for vagueness.87 
 Although the ACCA should be either voided for vagueness or 
amended by Congress, Judge Wilkinson’s concurrence in Vann repre-
sented a valiant attempt to adhere to congressional intent where the 
text could not provide resolution.88 Congress simply did not intend to 
punish vile conduct like indecent liberties with a child; it sought to 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We should admit that ACCA’s re-
sidual provision is a drafting failure and declare it void for vagueness.”); Chambers, 555 U.S. 
at 134 (Alito, J., concurring) (“At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is for 
Congress to formulate a specific list of expressly defined crimes that are deemed to be 
worthy of ACCA’s sentencing enhancement.”); Runyan, supra note 22, at 463 (arguing that 
the Supreme Court has failed to provide a workable standard to help guide the lower fed-
eral courts). 
84 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting); April K. Whitescarver, Chambers v. 
United States: Filling in the Gaps When Interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act., 13 Jones L. 
Rev. 89, 95 (2009) (discussing Justice Scalia’s argument in his 2007 dissent in James v. Unit-
ed States that there is no concrete guidance for lower federal judges to apply the residual 
provision with consistency). In his dissenting opinion in James, Justice Scalia asserted that 
“Congress has simply abdicated its responsibility when it passes a criminal statute insuscep-
tible of an interpretation that enables principled, predictable application; and this Court 
has abdicated its responsibility when it allows that.” 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
85 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Elena Kagan echoed simi-
lar sentiments in her dissenting opinion in Sykes in which she argued that “[t]he best that 
can be said for the Court’s approach is that it is very narrow—indeed, that it decides al-
most no case other than this one.” See id. at 2295 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
86 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006); see Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
87 See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284; see also supra note 76 (providing additional support for 
this argument). 
88 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 801 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Judge Wilkinson observed the 
difficulties courts are experiencing in applying the residual clause of the ACCA and ar-
gued that when judicial inquiries become overly complex, the most simplistic solution is to 
look to congressional intent. See id. 
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punish violent conduct.89 Furthermore, assuming (as the Vann per 
curiam majority did) that the modified categorical approach applies, 
the Shepard-approved documents in this case provided no basis on 
which to classify indecent liberties as a violent felony because they did 
not specify what conduct Vann pled guilty to.90 The only documents 
available (a 1991 indictment and a 1998 information) simply restated 
the language of the indecent liberties statute.91 Although this would 
seem to exclude some violent offenders, it prevents arbitrary punish-
ment and permits adequate punishment via state statutes and the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines.92 Consequently, until Congress or the Su-
preme Court provide a better solution, other courts should apply 
Judge Wilkinson’s concurrence and focus strictly on punishing crimi-
nals who are truly violent and more dangerous when in possession of 
a handgun rather than harshly punishing criminals simply because 
their conduct may be heinous.93 
Conclusion 
 The conflicting opinions of the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc in 
Vann illuminated the problems presented by the ambiguous, broad 
language in the ACCA’s residual clause. The Fourth Circuit is not alone 
in its struggle to interpret what constitutes a violent felony under this 
clause. Many federal courts have struggled to analyze ACCA residual 
clause cases, including the Supreme Court, which has provided incon-
sistent precedent when applying the ACCA. This poses a significant 
problem because the stakes for defendants in ACCA cases are immense: 
offenses that only carry ten-year maximum sentences have the potential 
to carry fifteen-year minimum sentences with the possibility of life im-
prisonment. These fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentences cannot 
rest on an ambiguous statute incapable of yielding an intelligible prin-
ciple by which federal judges can readily discern which offenses are 
violent. There are only two sufficient courses of action to ensure that 
extended prison sentences are not imposed on those who Congress did 
not intend to punish: congressional amendment of the ACCA or a Su-
preme Court decision striking the ACCA down as an unconstitutionally 
vague statute. In the meantime, because Judge Wilkinson’s concur-
                                                                                                                      
89 See id. at 804. 
90 See id. at 805. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 804; Montgomery, supra note 24, at 738. 
93 See Vann, 660 F.3d at 804 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
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rence in Vann closely adhered to congressional intent, lower federal 
courts should follow his lead until Congress or the Supreme Court 
takes substantive action. 
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